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Short Abstract
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Legal anthropology has created a series of adjectives to categorize law. Beyond this, it is still essential to think about law without an adjective and to ask how it is formulated, to take much-needed distance from state-centred or human-centred legal discourse. This panel brings together scholars from legal anthropology, science and technology studies, public international law, and philosophy of law to tackle definitional boundaries and hierarchies of law at the margins against contexts of uncertainties.
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Long Abstract
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Legal anthropology has created a series of adjectives to categorize law, such as customary, informal, unofficial, etc. Beyond this, it is still essential to think about law without an adjective and to ask how it is formulated, to take much-needed distance from state-centred or human-centred legal discourse. As Riles (2000) and Latour (2010) had shed light on the “making of law” in state institutions and international human rights conferences, we see that categories of law should not be taken for granted. The context in which those legal categories work, beyond the classic dichotomies such as human and non-human, reason and emotion, demands closer attention. This panel will bring together scholars from legal anthropology, science and technology studies, public international law and philosophy of law to tackle definitional boundaries and hierarchies of law at the margins against contexts of uncertainties. We aim to explore with renewed interest questions that engaged early work on legal anthropology: what processes eventually justify specific modes of reasoning as legal? What are the aspects included or excluded, and how? How are various categories of law imagined, and how do these categories interact?
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